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Abstract 
The juxtaposition of legal sovereignty against 
international duty (in the form of fostering greater respect 
for human rights across the globe) became one of the 
founding attributes of the post World War II political 
regime. Several human rights legislations were coined, 
deliberated upon, and ratified. However, the fact that 
ratification alone has not led to better human rights 
regime is something that many would not deny. In fact, 
this entire concept of drafting soft law principles has been 
cynically questioned by critics, citing the lack of a proper 
enforcement mechanism and real legitimacy as reasons 
for its failure. Moreover, several empirical studies have 
been evidence of the fact that respect for human rights is 
more intrinsically connected with ancillary principles 
such as a democratic regime, the strength of participation 
of civil society, the conflict status of a country and several 
others, and not treaty ratification alone. It is this claim 
that the researcher has analyzed in the course of this 
paper. 
Keywords: Governance, Human Rights, International Community 
Legislation, Treaty. 
Introduction  
Amidst long lasting argumentative discourse, critics of 
international human rights treaties argue against the real 
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effectiveness of soft law legislation, citing examples of nations that 
have ratified treaties but failed to implement them within domestic 
territory, which only weakens the very basis of human rights 
legislation. While the gap between universal right and remedy 
becomes even more unavoidable, the question which automatically 
puts the validity of documents such as the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights 1948 (UDHR) or the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR) at stake, is whether such treaties 
substantially improve respect for human right standards or not. 
Other relevant human rights treaties displaying the same problems 
include the International Convention on the Elimination of all 
forms of Racial Discrimination 1966 (ICERD), Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 1979 
(CEDAW), Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984 (CATOCIDTP.) and 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (CRC). If a statistical 
analysis into the compliance records of nations which have signed 
as well as ratified such documents is undertaken, the fact that such 
a proposition is not unfounded is significantly proved. A classic 
example of such non compliance is the Equatorial Guinea, which 
ratified the ICCPR 1966 on the 25th day of September, 1987. A 
Human Rights Watch report on the occurrence of human rights 
violations in the area has documented the extent up to which 
corruption, poverty, and repression continue to plague the country 
under President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, who has been 
in power since 1979.1 A country is heavily driven to preserve its 
reputation in the international arena;2 ratification is only a 
preliminary move to preserve the same and in no way ensures 
better compliance.3 
The major compliance mechanisms that exist in other areas of 
international law are mostly absent in the area of human rights. 
                                                          
1 Human Rights Watch, Equatorial Guinea: Human Rights Concerns Ahead of 
Elections (May 7, 2013), available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/ 05/ 
07/equatorial-guinea-human-rights-concerns-ahead-elections.  
2 Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 
CAL. L. REV. 1823 (2002). 
3 See LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE (Columbia University Press 2nd 
ed. 1979). 
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Unlike finance or trade, there is a lack of economically determined 
forces of the globalized market that more often than not, force 
compliance by means of systemic interaction. Structurally different 
from agreements in trade, non compliance does not have a 
prescribed punishment mechanism, stemming from the fact that a 
nation’s actions against its own citizens do not directly threaten or 
harm other states.4 For instance, if one were to talk specifically 
about global trade, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
through its dual principles of ‘most favored nation treatment’ as 
well as ‘national treatment’, ensure that by and large, arbitrary and 
unfair discrimination of imported products in the domestic markets 
is reduced. This was specifically observed in the Japan-Taxes on 
Alcoholic Beverages Case,5 wherein the concerned World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Panel unanimously ordered the immediate 
withdrawal of a locally produced brand of Japanese alcohol, which 
was being awarded arbitrary benefits under a local tax law. The 
result of this was the withdrawal of the tax benefit by the Japanese 
government. The purpose of providing this example is only to 
prove that the scope that exists for non compliance to universally 
accepted principles of compliance is much lesser when compared 
to the field of human rights. As far as trade and finance are 
concerned, market forces coupled with national commercial 
interest are the primary reason for observing better records of 
compliance. Therefore, it is contended that international human 
rights treaties do not substantially increase the overall respect for 
internationally accepted principles of human rights. 
Cultural Relativism and Critical Legal Jurisprudence 
The issue of cultural relativism, which envisages the role of the 
state in fostering respect for cultural norms and traditions, further 
puts the universality of human rights at jeopardy. Owing to such 
cultural norms and traditions that are given predominance over the 
rule of international law, respecting the terms put down in a 
ratified treaty becomes a matter of discretion rather than a matter 
                                                          
4 STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 364-365 
(Princeton University Press 1999). 
5 Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DSI0/AB/R, WT/DSI1I/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996).  
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of obligation. Questions of this nature have become inherently 
important to human rights discourse, gauging from the 
expenditure of both time and money involved in the drafting and 
deliberation of any international legislation and the continual 
denial of rights inalienable to every human being. 
Several schools of political theory have employed methods of 
empirical as well as analytical study into this field of research, only 
to be further exasperated at not being able to answer its daunting 
questions in terms of a simple yes or no.6 Indeed, the past has been 
witness to the growing need of countries across the globe to 
improve upon their image, leading them to ratify conventions and 
treaties and eventually abandon the same within domestic 
territory. While it can be said that the lack of enforcement of 
international bodies and the utmost authority of sovereignty 
becomes the essential cause of this, it can be seen that democracies 
and autocracies respond differently to various situations in 
international human rights law. The critical political interplay 
between public opinion and law in democracies has a crucial role to 
play in the effectiveness of international legislation in countries. It 
is a widely held view that democracies tend to give more respect to 
international legislation in general. 
A classical realist argument, heavily influenced by the assumption 
that states are unitary actors entering the political power play 
primarily to serve their own geopolitical interests, contends that the 
citizens of one country are not substantially affected by human 
rights violations in other countries, which is precisely why it would 
make very little sense (from a strictly utilitarian viewpoint) for a 
country like the United States to put their oil trade relations with 
Saudi Arabia in any sort of jeopardy because the latter has 
displayed an atrocious human rights record since time 
immemorial. Interestingly, while on one hand, the United States 
has ratified only seven International Labour Organization (ILO) 
human rights treaties out of nineteen, the same country has a 
Foreign Assistance Act 1961 that promises not to provide any sort 
of financial aid to countries engaging in a consistent pattern of 
                                                          
6 Douglass Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?, 
2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 121, 121-135 (2001). 
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gross violation of internationally recognized human rights.7 It is 
therefore extremely difficult to trace the behavior of a country in 
the past and predict its future actions based on such findings. 
Similarly, unless and until there is a significant percentage of 
Indians living in a country such as North Korea or Equatorial 
Guinea who are subject to gross violations, there is no reason to 
suspend a bilateral agreement between the two countries. The 
battle here is about what is more profitable to do instead of what 
should be done, reinforcing the propositions of legal realism. 
However, the one inference which can be made from a realist 
argument is about the ability of the first world to influence respect 
for human rights, in the event of such a country going ahead and 
enforcing legislation dealing with non compliance (as in the case of 
USA).   
A second proposition, put forward by the desegregationist, attacks 
the state centric definition put forward by the functionalists and 
realists, by saying that states are not monolithic units. This 
particular group of theorists, consisting of Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs), Transnational Corporations (TNCs), 
professional associations and other social classes, emphasize the 
fact that the State comprises of a group of persons with varying 
interests. An argument flowing directly from such a proposition is 
the role of NGOs as ‘institutionalist enablers’ or as activists capable 
of change, setting in motion the process for domestic policy change. 
In fact, history has long been witness to NGOs often conducting 
independent research that potentially influences state policy. By 
playing a role greater than simply assisting states in the pursuance 
of their agenda, these independent entities are more devoted to a 
specific agenda, to which the particular regime may not have 
devoted enough attention. Instances of such behavior have been 
exhibited through the role of NGOs playing a significant role in the 
United Nations designation of the Decade for Women’s Rights and 
the establishment of the International Criminal Court.8 While there 
is general consensus on the fact that a country comprises various 
                                                          
7 The Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 116. 
8 United Nations, Global Issues: Women, available at 
http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/women/ (last visited Dec. 16, 
2013). 
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pressure groups and other relevant domestic actors, this theory 
primarily posits that democracies are more likely to comply with 
supranational legal judgments, considering the fact that 
international legal obligations mobilize domestic interest groups to 
exert pressure on the government to comply with accepted 
standards.9 In fact, it would be more useful to look at the sort of 
interaction and internalization processes laid down by the 
proponents of the transnational human rights advocacy school. 
Several scholars from this school of thought suggest that certain 
transnational actors such as diplomats or NGOs form what they 
call an ‘epistemic human rights community’, who play an 
exceedingly important role in the entire negotiation model.  
The final treaty text (drafted after the conclusion of the deliberation 
processes) represents the common interpretation of both the state 
actors as well as the other players within domestic law, so as to 
uphold the spirit of any international legislation as far as possible. 
Human rights networks consisting of dedicated parties enable a 
rather long (or maybe even short) period of transition from 
unconstrained repression to rule consistent behavior via modes of 
denial, tactical concessions and prescriptive status. Initially, of 
course, the domestic political opposition is too weak to constrain 
human rights violations and the country manages to escape the 
attention of transnational advocacy networks. However, triggered 
by events of particularly gross human rights violations, the 
network automatically starts putting the regime under pressure by 
disseminating information, putting in jeopardy the public image of 
the same, and mobilizing international public opinion against it. 
While offending countries usually respond in the mode of denial, 
there is a probable change in this attitude, where sustained 
pressure and criticism leads to a desire to diffuse such international 
image. If one takes the example of the Republic of India, the 
transition from absolute non compliance to gradual respect 
becomes clear.  
Human right violation in the form of caste atrocities have been one 
of the initial roots of what many perceive as an excessively 
                                                          
9 Martti Koskenniemi, The Place of Law in Collective Security, 17 MICH. J. 
INT'L L. 455 (1996). 
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repressive social structure. In 2007, the United Nations Committee 
on Elimination of Racial Discrimination, reported acts of the state 
engaging in extrajudicial killings and arbitrary arrest against the 
members of the so called backward castes, the scheduled castes and 
tribes, occupying the lowest position in the Varna system of India.10 
Human rights violations ranged from arbitrary acts such as killing, 
rape, humiliation, among other forms of the worst kinds of human 
rights violations. Initially, there was very little that the government 
could do, following from the fact that caste division had a lot to do 
with the electoral politics in the country, and the huge percentage 
of the vote bank that the upper castes commanded. However, the 
landmark move towards compliance came with India’s ratification 
of the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Racial Discrimination (ICERD) in 1968, which was shortly followed 
by the passing of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes (Prevention of 
Atrocities) Act 1989, which when read with Article 17 of the Indian 
Constitution, bans every form of discrimination throughout the 
country. Even though such legislation hasn’t been able to combat 
issues surrounding discrimination against other groups such as the 
religious minorities very effectively, caste based discrimination has 
reduced to a significant extent, a major reason for exerting  
pressure by the international community, as well as sustained 
efforts on part of the media to expose the backwardness of 
traditional social perception. The period ranging from the adoption 
of the ICERD Convention in 1968 until the passing of the domestic 
legislation in 1989, was marked by several international research 
organizations and NGOs which engaged in a detailed deliberation 
process with most of the instruments of the state and managed to 
cause a change in thinking. This of course was backed by the media 
conducting trials on a daily basis, enabling scholars and activists to 
influence public thinking towards a more positive direction. This 
again shows clearly the sort of effect that public opinion has on the 
enactment of the law.  
 
                                                          
10 U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Consideration 
of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Art. 9 of the Convention, 14 U.N. 
Doc. CERD/C/IND/CO/19 (May 5, 2007). 
Devarshi Mukhopadhyay                                                           ISSN 2278-4322 
24 
 
Procedural Changes in International Governance 
The value that the vote bank has to the ruling party or coalition in 
any democracy is probably the one thing which may lead to an 
upward sloping graph of human rights records. In this regard, the 
principal recommendations put forward by Professor Bayefsky in 
The UN Human Rights Treaty System: Universality at the 
Crossroads,11 talks at length about a reporting process, whereby 
state parties will mandatorily be required to submit to the 
international arena, a report of their progress/compliance with the 
terms and conditions set out in the treaties which they have 
ratified. The primary issue with such a proposition is the absence of 
a monitoring system which ensures that such reports have 
information which is valid in its entirety and the action which it 
claims to have taken has actually been taken. What appears 
relatively more practical, although expensive, is establishing a 
monitoring department of the United Nations (within the ambit of 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner of Human 
Rights) in countries which display particularly poor records and 
propose a model like the United States did, through its Foreign 
Assistance Act 1961 hoping to cause better standards of 
compliance. Similarly, logistical impediments such as information 
sharing by means of a central database system have prevented an 
increase in the efficiency of the bodies established by the treaties 
themselves, creating further lacunae in the enforcement machinery. 
As regards the issue of monitoring, problems of staff members 
being continuously shifted and therefore losing track of conditions 
prevailing in a certain country, the researcher contends the 
establishment of a permanent area specific staff body, whose shift 
in that area lasts for as long as that particular phase of reporting 
has not been completed. What therefore becomes evident is that the 
literature of these treaties set the heights of utopia as their 
objective, while it doesn’t necessarily have the means or the 
established system to accomplish it.  
                                                          
11Anne F. Bayefsky, The UN Human Rights Treaty System: Universality at the 
Crossroads (Apr. 2001), available at http://www.bayefsky.com/report/ 
finalreport.pdf.  
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Institutionalism takes a slightly more optimistic view of the 
international political arena, proposing that political actors will 
comply with international standards as a result of strategy. In 
contrast with realist theoretical models, the institutionalists seek to 
study the reasons behind the existence of international institutions, 
but weigh the costs against the benefits to decide whether or not 
rules are to be complied.12Here too, countries face a dilemma 
similar to the one put forward by the neo realist school of thought 
that whether a threatening group would go ahead with a sanction 
even after knowing that the costs of such an action would easily 
overshadow the benefits?13 A major institutionalist assumption is 
also that cooperation forms the basis of international law. In 
situations where such cooperation is clearly at stake, will global 
actors make the compromise? Evidently, reflections from the 21st 
century prove beyond reasonable doubt that the chances are 
relatively bleak. While the number of treaty ratifications has 
increased from a meager 243 in 1980 to an astounding 926 in 2000,14 
there is lesser doubt about the fact that more and more countries of 
the world, have resorted to the strategy which this school talks 
about. A strategy not made with the sole objective of granting 
citizens their inalienable rights, but to improve an individual 
nation’s image globally. Syria was one of the original 48 countries 
that voted in favour of Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 
December 10, 1948 (UDHR). Soon after the outbreak of the Arab 
Spring, Syrian government forces, in collaboration with the deadly 
Shabiha went on a systematic rampage to counter the rebels. The 
Shabiha are an allegedly state sponsored group of armed men and 
terrorists who committed what Amnesty International reports as 
one of the bloodiest armed conflicts in the history of mankind. 
These atrocities have been committed in areas extending from Idlib 
to Jebel-Al-Zawiyah, reinforcing the volatile nature of human 
rights in the face of conflict.15 What one can clearly gauge from the 
                                                          
12 THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (Hedley Bull et al. eds., 
Oxford University Press 1984). 
13 THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC 
CHANGE (Thomas Risse et al. eds., Cambridge University Press 1999). 
14 Supra note 11. 
15 Amnesty International, Deadly Reprisals: Deliberate Killings and Other 
Abuses by Syria’s Armed Forces (Jun. 14, 2012), available at 
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behavior of the afore mentioned country is how weak the human 
rights regime actually is. The country which at the time of 
ratification seemed to be committed to the ideals of the UDHR 
ruthlessly went about violating most of its terms when threatened 
in domestic territory. While we do somewhere agree that 
ratification of treaty does form the basis of a start to fostering 
greater respect in the future, what plagues the minds of critics is 
when such a time in the future shall actually come. It is practically 
impossible to predict future behavior, considering the fact that non 
compliance can happen any number of years after the treaty has 
been adopted. Syria acted nearly 60 years after it ratified the UDHR 
in 1948. Hence, the best that international political actors can do is 
to start enforcing treaty provisions from the very beginning itself, 
so that the change is not temporary but systemic.  
What transpires from the examination of the propositions put 
forward by the various jurisprudential schools of thought in 
matters of human rights is that the patterns of democracy and the 
role of civil society have a direct impact on human rights 
compliance. Drafting more treaties does not essentially make any 
relevant difference to what countries promise to do at an 
international platform but completely ignore to do within domestic 
territory. Moreover, owing to the lack of force, enforcement 
becomes a gradual impossibility as well, exposing the lacunae in 
the international legal principles with each passing day. As the 
world’s most repressive societies torture human beings every day, 
international political players face two pivotal questions. First, 
whether democracy is the only answer to better human rights 
records (thereby signaling the absolute dearth of efficiency of the 
international bodies to enforce compliance in non democracies) and 
second, whether further treaty formulation will do any real good to 
respect for human rights or not. The researcher believes that the 21st 
century is one where growth commands policy-making in general 
and foreign policy in particular, resulting in a diminishing 
importance of respect for human beings and the rights guaranteed 
to them by birth. In a time like this, we cannot ask for better human 
rights standards. There is no greater force in this world than the 
                                                                                                                                    
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE24/041/2012/en/3041
6985-883b-4e67-b386-0df14a79f694/mde240412012en.pdf. 
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will of the people, as was clearly evidenced when the Arab Spring 
broke out. The basic fact of the matter still remains that revolution 
rests upon the mass, and not the governing minority. With the 
economic meltdown of 2007 disrupting established commercial 
order and the throne of the economic hegemon now up for grabs, 
we cannot reasonably expect a miraculous effort of states to enforce 
treaty provisions. Therefore, it wouldn’t be unreasonable to 
contend that revolution is the only way to better enforcement. The 
formulation of more treaties does not substantially increase the 
global respect for human rights. 
Effectiveness of the Institutionalized Law Making 
Processes 
In the last part of this paper, focus is laid on the institutionalized 
law making process (specifically the enforcing capacity of the 
Security Council) and whether or not international human rights 
treaties, while empowering such bodies, actually make their tasks 
easier/possible. In fact, the question of enforcement after 
formulation becomes most important to any human rights debate. 
One would often be driven to believe, that the ambiguity in the 
language of several legislations of international law reflects upon 
the intent of the peace loving community to accommodate the 
changing face of the law per se, and aim at greater fulfillment of 
purpose. Such ambiguity is clearly evident in the wording of 
Article 2(4), 2(7) and 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which 
use rather non self-explanatory terms such as ‘use of force’ or 
‘territorial integrity’ or even ‘political independence’. The past has 
seen immense criticism surrounding the ‘real’ powers vested in the 
Security Council, when nations of the world blatantly went around 
disobeying treaty provisions, the Rwandan Genocide being the best 
example of international inaction in the face of the ‘responsibility to 
protect’. While the authority of enforcement, spoken about in 
Chapter VII has hardly ever been resorted to, the Security Council 
did not do too much to interpret the Charter’s apparent triggers for 
such action (Article 39), the preconditions and scope of the 
Council’s authorized responses (under Articles 40-42) or even the 
meaning of ‘enforcement action’ for the purposes of Article 2(7). 
Juxtaposing the intervention following the Korean Peninsular 
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Crisis or the actions of the Council in Kuwait, against its 
peacekeeping missions in Congo or Suez, the researcher notes two 
things. Firstly, peacekeeping missions have often been extremely 
long and ineffective and secondly, the Security Council, by way of 
the political structure in the permanent seats, rarely has the chance 
of resorting to armed intervention, in its pursuit to enforce human 
rights treaties. However, the Security Council itself has devised 
innovative means to do more than what the law allows it to, for the 
sake of human rights protection. For example, the forms of 
peacekeeping discussed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
provide a restricted scope of the authority of the UN Despite the 
power of territorial administration not being granted under the 
International Trusteeship System under Article 78 of the Charter, 
Resolution 678 of 199016 was a clear instance of innovation in the 
face of conflict. If the treaties themselves legitimize such practices, 
it automatically allows for a greater amount of potential work for 
the upliftment of human rights standards.  
In light of the Security Council’s ambiguous deployment of its 
declarative and interpretative functions, enforcement needs greater 
legitimacy. By virtue of rights guaranteed to an individual by birth, 
it becomes by default, the obligation of the international 
community to ensure that such rights are not taken away. Caught 
in the battle between cultural relativism and international 
obligation, examples from world politics show that more treaties 
are not of substantial use, unless the entire system is restructured in 
a manner conducive to enforcement and greater respect for human 
rights. 
Conclusion 
Examples from world politics often do confirm with theories put 
forward by various schools of jurisprudence, displaying behavior 
that conforms to predictions made by such thinkers. While it is true 
that political patterns are changing and a greater number of 
countries are displaying better human rights records, this positive 
shift is only minimal and not substantial. The reason behind this is 
that even the highest deliberation platforms in the world, such as 
                                                          
16 S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990). 
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the United Nations, have members who have a very limited idea as 
to what human rights are and why they are so important to us. 
Countries in the continent of Africa are the best example of this. For 
several such countries, torture and absolute obedience has been the 
way of life since inception and any effort to change this would 
amount to a direct attack on an individual countries’ sovereignty. 
Similarly, there are numerous countries in the Middle East , where 
even after revolution has struck, the masses themselves prefer 
autocratic governance, which in turn paves way for the blatant 
discretion of obeying international law principles. What we can 
therefore gauge, is that ratification of treaty is only the beginning of 
fostering greater respect for human rights. There is a need for 
restructuring world politics in a manner conducive to enforcement 
of human rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
